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1.  Introduction 
One of the most frequently used application in econometrics is the estimation of 
earnings functions to assess wage differentials. The dependent variable is usually the 
log of earnings and measured on the basis of year, month, week, day, or hour. Most 
economic models rely on the hourly wage rate. In empirical practice, however, several 
hourly wage measures can be computed from the data and the question is which one is 
preferable. Contractual hourly wages (total income divided by contractual working 
hours) are normally used since they can be easily computed in most data sets. This 
might be problematic in an economic interpretation because a worker's utility does not 
depend on contractual working hours but on effective working hours and his perceived 
wage rate is not the contractual but the effective hourly wage (total income divided by 
effective working hours). Moreover, firms are interested in effective wages and not in 
contractual wages when making employment decisions. Thus, it is of central importance 
to define effective working hours and to assess the empirical importance of different 
hourly wage measures. 
Some studies take into account overtime work when defining effective working hours 
and computing hourly wages (e.g., Bell and Hart, 1999; Bell et al., 2000; Hübler, 2002; 
Wolf, 2002; Anger, 2007). Overtime is however only one form of working time 
adjustment, which is upward orientated. In the presence of fixed contractual working 
hours, a worker might choose overtime work if his utility maximizing working hours 
are larger than contractual working hours. The important case of downward adjustment 
of working time via paid absenteeism is on the other hand largely ignored.
1 If working 
                                                 
1 Absenteeism refers to reported sickness related work absence of employees. Such sickness reports need 
not to be true. Even if an employee is really sick, he can choose to some degree how long he stays from 2 
 
time constraints are present that induce a worker to accept a contract with larger than his 
optimal working hours, a worker can use absence to approach his optimal level of 
working hours (Allen, 1981; Brown and Sessions, 1996; Dunn and Youngblood, 1986).    
This paper uses a personnel data set of a German company that is perfectly suitable to 
study the above issue because it comprises exact information about contractual, absent, 
and effective working hours as well as about wages. Moreover, the German case is of 
special interest for a first study due to its very generous institutional sickness benefits 
(Osterkamp and Röhn, 2007; Frick and Malo, 2008). Sick pay in Germany is regulated 
in the Act on Continued Payment of Remuneration (“Lohnfortzahlungsgesetz”). An 
employee who is sick for more than three days has to present a medical certificate of 
sickness from his physician. Sick employees have a legitimate claim of 100 percent 
wage replacement paid by the firm from the first absent day and for a period up to six 
weeks. In case of longer sickness absence due to the same disease, the wage 
replacement rate decreases to 70 percent and is paid by the health insurance up to 78 
weeks. The issue of effective wages is, however, not only relevant for Germany but to 
some degree for every institutional setting in which workers receive sickness benefits 
when absent from work.  
The next section illustrates the basic theoretical context, which is based on the static 
labour supply and demand models, and the relevance of effective hourly wages. Section 
3 informs about the data set, basic descriptive statistics for hours and earnings, and 
                                                                                                                                               
work to recover from a disease or injury. Worker absenteeism is hence often used as a proxy for work 
effort, which is justified because absenteeism can be interpreted as shirking behaviour as well as a signal 
for work attachment (Barmby et al. 1994; Brown and Sessions, 1996; Ichino and Moretti 2009). 3 
 
different inequality measures for contractual and effective wages. The regression results 
for hours and wages are presented in Section 4. The paper concludes with a summary 
and discussion of the results. 
 
2.  Theoretical framework 
A worker's decision to be absent from work can be modelled in the framework of the 
static neo-classical labour supply model (Allen, 1981; Brown and Sessions, 1996). Let a 
worker's utility U in equation (1) depend positively on total consumption and total 
leisure. Leisure L is a fixed amount of time T minus the time spend at work H as 
depicted in equation (2). Consumption is generated from total income, which is for 
simplicity only labour income. Total labour income Y in equation (3) is constrained by 
the product of hourly wages w and the total number of working hours H.  








 (2)    =− LTH  
 (3)    = Yw H  
The worker's problem is to maximize his utility in equation (1) under the time constraint 
in equation (2) and the budget constraint in equation (3). The standard textbook solution 
is that a worker chooses to work as many hours until his marginal rate of substitution 
between leisure and consumption equals the hourly wage rate (∂ ∂ = ∂∂
UL w UY ). In 
the graphical solution in Figure 1, the worker's optimal working hours choice H* is the 4 
 
tangential point of the indifference curve (U*) and the budget constraint with the slope 
C ww −= − . 
  - insert Figure 1 about here 
In the next step, the distinction between contractual and effective working hours and 
wages is made and illustrated in Figure 1. If the worker has to decide about accepting a 
job, firms offer him a fixed contractual numbers of working hours HC and fixed 
contractual hourly wages wC (e.g., due to collective contracts or inflexible work and pay 
schedules). The worker might have to accept a contract with larger than his optimal 
working hours ( * H HC >  and  < C UU * ) because of such working hours constraints 
and a lack of better job opportunities. As a worker cares only about the working hours 
actually being at work, which are effective working hours HE, he might deviate from 
contractual working hours. The difference between HC and HE can in principle be 
negative, i.e., the worker makes an upward adjustment of working time via overtime 
hours (Bell and Hart, 1999) which is not subject of this analysis, or positive, i.e., the 
worker makes a downward adjustment of working time via (fully) paid absent working 
hours HA, which are valued by the worker as leisure hours.
2 The latter is possible as 
workers in Germany receive a 100 percent wage replacement rate in case of - sickness 
related - absenteeism. As total income YC is, at least if long-term aspects are not taken 
into account (Brown, 1994), independent of effective working hours, the worker 
perceives his effective hourly wage wE as different from the contractual wage wC. The 
                                                 
2 The assumption that all reported sickness absence is leisure increasing shirking behaviour of workers is 
quite strong. But it is useful to illustrate the issues of interested.  5 
 
new time and budget constraints are as in equations (4) and (5) and the effective hourly 
wage is then calculated following equation (6). 
 (4) =− + =− CA E LTH H TH  
 (5)    = =− = CC CE C A E E Yw Hw ( HH ) w H   







(H H ) H
  
The new budget constraint is a horizontal line at  = CC C Yw H  due to the 100 percent 
wage replacement (see equation (5)). The worker has therefore an incentive to be as 
much absent as possible. In the extreme case, the worker would choose not to appear at 
work at all (HE=0 and L=T). Such an behaviour is however unlikely to be tolerated by 
firms and likely to have negative career consequences (e.g., layoff, training, wage 
growth, promotion). Fairness and work group norms can also restrict such an extreme 
behaviour (e.g., unfair towards colleagues as they have to work more) (Bradley et al., 
2007). Thus, a worker might choose reference points to determine his amount of absent 
and effective working hours (Munro and Sugden, 2003). He could for example choose 
his original optimal working hours (HE=H*) or his original optimal utility level 
( => > CC E U * U ( Y , HHH * ) ) as reference points. The former example with HE=H* is 
used to briefly illustrate the effect of absenteeism on effective hourly wages and utility. 
The perceived effective hourly wage is total contractual income divided by effective 
working hours (see equation (6)) which results into a steeper hypothetical budget 
constraint because  C E w w > . Further, utility in case of absenteeism is larger than to 
adhere contractual working hours ( EC E CC C U( Y, H H * ) U( Y, H) = > ) because  C E H H < . 6 
 
Differences between workers in absence behaviour and consequently in effective wages 
can arise from heterogeneous preferences for leisure and consumption. Workers who 
defer in their optimal working hours are also likely to have different reference levels for 
effective working hours. A worker with lower optimal working hours is then likely to 
have more absent working hours and a higher effective wage compared to a worker 
whose optimal working hours do not deviate much from contractual working hours. 
Moreover, workers might be offered different contractual wages which also leads to 
different optimal working hours and reference levels. If workers with low contractual 
wages are more absent than workers with high contractual wages, the differences in 
effective wages between both groups would be lower than the differences in contractual 
wages. 
Effective wages are furthermore crucial in the determination of labour demand, which is 
illustrated again in the static neo-classical model. A competitive firm maximizes its 
profits (∏) in equation (7) if the difference between the value of total output (pQ) and 
costs is maximised. We assume market output prices (p), a fixed production technology 
(Q), constant capital (K), market capital prices (r), and market contractual wages (wC). 
Moreover, total labour input consists of the number of workers (N) times effective 
working hours (HE), which are contractual working hours (HC) minus absent working 
hours (HA≤HC). As the firm has to pay the contractual wage regardless of absent 
working hours (100 percent wage replacement), total labour costs are independent of 
absent working hours. Following the above computation of effective wages in equations 
(5) and (6), contractual labour costs can be reformulated into effective labour costs. 
Because workers are homogenous, all workers provide the same number of working 
hours. Furthermore, absent working hours are exogenously chosen by workers. Thus, 7 
 
the firm’s only choice variable is total labour input. The standard first order condition in 
(8) yields that a firm hires workers up to the point in which effective wages equal the 
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The discrepancy between contractual and effective wages arises quite obviously, 
because effective wages are larger than contractual wages in case of workers' downward 
adjustment of working time via paid absenteeism. Thus, labour demand would be too 
high if falsely contractual instead of effective wages are taken into account, which 
would result into a loss of profits. Furthermore, a firm might statistical discriminate 
against worker groups with higher absenteeism, which would result into lower 
employment chances for these workers (Aigner and Cain, 1977; Pfeifer and Sohr, 
2008). 
 
3.  Data set and descriptive statistics 
The data set was extracted directly from computerized personnel records of a large 
German limited liability company that produces innovative products for the world 
market. The company has a works council and is subject to an industry wide collective 8 
 
contract. The personnel records contain information on all employees in the company’s 
headquarter on a monthly basis from January 1999 to December 2005. The subsequent 
empirical analysis includes all blue-collar and white-collar workers, who are neither 
apprentices nor trainees, who are not in early retirement schemes, and who are not 
absent on a permanent basis (e.g., parental leave, sabbaticals). Moreover, monthly 
observations are aggregated on the basis of calendar years because individual 
absenteeism is very volatile over the year. Therefore, workers who are not observed for 
all twelve months in a calendar year are excluded from the sample. In sum, the sample 
contains 9633 yearly observations of 1790 workers in an unbalanced panel design.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about working hours and earnings. Workers have 
on average 1815.5 contractual working hours per year. Because workers also have on 
average 58.4 absent working hours per year, which are officially sickness related and 
fully paid, effective working hours are only 1757.1 and hence significantly lower.
3 
Workers are on average 3.25 percent of their contractual working time absent. The 
average probability that a worker reports absence in a year is larger than 70 percent. 
Nominal yearly gross income is on average 36727.6 Euros. The contractual hourly wage 
is computed by dividing yearly income by contractual working hours, whereas the 
effective hourly wage takes into account effective working hours in the denominator. 
The mean contractual wage is 20.00 Euros and the mean effective wage is significantly 
larger with 20.63 Euros, which are about three percent higher hourly wages.  
  - insert Table 1 about here 
                                                 
3 Unfortunately the personnel data set does not contain reliable information about unpaid overtime, which 
would be the opposite of downward adjustment via paid absenteeism. 9 
 
Figure 2 depicts the development of working hours and wages from 1999 to 2005. It can 
be seen that differences between contractual and effective working hours are quite 
stable, although working hours vary over time. Wages are largely increasing due to their 
nominal character; but the differences between contractual and effective wages are 
again stable. Overall, the descriptive statistics indicate that downward adjustment of 
working time via paid absenteeism is a non negligible factor which has a significant 
impact on hourly wages. 
  - insert Figure 2 about here 
Figure 3 depicts the distribution (kernel density estimations using Epanechnikov kernel 
function) of log contractual and effective hourly wages. It is not surprising that the 
distribution of effective wages is on the right hand side of the distribution of contractual 
wages. More interesting is, however, that especially workers at the lower tail of the 
wage distribution benefit if effective working hours are incorporated instead of 
contractual hours. The first picture, thus, suggests that inequality is lower for effective 
than for contractual wages because low wage workers might more frequently adjust 
their working time downwards via absenteeism to increase effective wages. This 
impression is supported by different inequality measures, which are summarized in 
Table 2. Although the standard deviation of contractual wages is slightly lower than of 
effective wages, which is due to the higher mean of the latter, all other inequality 
measures show a reduction in inequality when taking into account effective working 
time and wages, respectively. 
  - insert Figure 3 about here 
  - insert Table 2 about here 10 
 
4.  Regression analyses 
In this section, I estimate several regressions for hours and earnings using random 
effects GLS (generalized least squares) to exploit the panel nature of the data set. The 
Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test shows that the random effects model 
is more appropriate than cross sectional OLS (ordinary least squares), because the null 
hypothesis that the variance of the random effects equals zero is rejected at high 
significance levels in all regressions. Since most of our variables of interest (gender, 
schooling) are time invariant, fixed effects models are not very useful for the aim of this 
paper, which is to compare coefficients between different groups, namely by gender, 
highest schooling degree, and age categories.
4 In addition to these group indicating 
variables, all regressions include the observation years to control for aggregated 
influences and to deal with the nominal character of earnings.  
Two specifications are estimated for every outcome variable. The first specification 
does not control for job levels obtained from wage groups in the collective contract, 
because these levels are highly correlated with earnings as well as hours and can be 
interpreted as an outcome of other covariates.
5 Nevertheless, it might be interesting to 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion of random and fixed effects as well as their application to wage regressions 
with monthly data of the analyzed company see Pfeifer (2009). A comparison of the two models shows 
very little differences between the coefficients, which are however significant in a Hausman (1978) 
specification test due to the large sample size and very small standard errors. 
5 See Pfeifer (2008) for a discussion of the impact of tenure, age, schooling, and job levels on wages in 
the analyzed company. A description of the job levels obtained from the collective contract, which is 
binding to the company, can also be found in Pfeifer (2008). In the present paper, job levels fulfil only the 
purpose of an additional control variable. 11 
 
see if effects can still be found within job level, so that a second specification is 
estimated which includes twelve job level dummies. As the dependent variables have 
already been discussed at length in the previous section, Table 3 contains only a list of 
the independent variables and their descriptive statistics.  
  - insert Table 3 about here 
Table 4 informs about the results for hours regressions. Five different outcome variables 
are used to get an impression of differences between gender, schooling degrees, and age 
categories: (1) number of contractual working hours, (2) number of absent working 
hours, (3) absence rate ((2)/(1)), (4) absence probability ((2)>0), (5) number of effective 
working hours ((1)-(2)). Women have on average 137 contractual working hours less, 
are 14 hours more absent, have a higher absence rate of one percentage point, have a 
higher absence probability of nine percentage points, and work in total 150 effective 
working hours less than men. It can also be seen that higher schooling degrees are 
associated with more contractual working hours, fewer absent working hours, a lower 
absence rate and absence probability, and consequently with more effective working 
hours. When additionally controlling for job levels, the differences between the gender 
and schooling groups are reduced but remain largely significant. Overall the results on 
working hours and absenteeism are in line with previous research (e.g., Allen, 1981; 
Brown and Sessions, 1996; Dunn and Youngblood, 1986; Bradley et al., 2007; Ichino 
and Moretti, 2009).  
  - insert Table 4 about here 
Age has a more complex impact on hours. First, older workers have more absent hours 
and a higher absence rate, even though the absence probability is not significantly 12 
 
affected by age. These results are quite similar in both specifications with and without 
job levels. Working hours, however, give not a conclusive picture, because statistical 
significance is low and some age coefficients even change their signs if job levels are 
incorporated. Nevertheless, it seems as older workers provide on average fewer 
effective hours since they are on average more hours absent. 
The results of earnings regressions are presented in Table 5. The dependent variables 
are (1) log yearly income, (2) log contractual hourly wage, and (3) log effective hourly 
wage. All regressions reveal the usual findings that women earn significantly less than 
men, that more schooling is associated with significant higher earnings, that age-
earnings profiles are upward sloping concave with slightly negative wage growth for the 
oldest workers, and that coefficients are smaller in the specifications with job levels as 
these absorb parts of the effects (Pfeifer, 2008). The aim of this paper is, however, to 
compare wage differential estimates between the different earnings measures with a 
special focus on differences between contractual and effective wages.
6 Hausman (1978) 
specification tests between the regressions reject the null hypothesis of no systematic 
differences between the models at high significance levels. Moreover, a fourth 
specification is estimated in which the dependent variable is the difference between log 
contractual wages and log effective wages. The significance of the estimated 
coefficients indicates that the estimated wage differentials differ significantly between 
contractual and effective wages.  
  - insert Table 5 about here 
                                                 
6 Bell and Hart (1999) perform a quite similar exercise for unpaid overtime. 13 
 
On the one hand, wage differentials between men and women as well as between 
schooling degrees are smaller in effective wage regressions than in contractual wage 
regressions. The gender gap in hourly wages is reduced by more than one percentage 
point if effective instead of contractual working hours are taken into account. The wage 
premiums of workers with high school and college degrees are about two percentage 
points smaller for effective than for contractual hourly wages. On the other hand, the 
effects of age on wages are larger in effective wage regressions than in contractual wage 
regressions. Figure 4 illustrates the predicted age-earnings profiles of average workers 
for contractual and effective hourly wages from the specifications without job levels and 
Figure 5 illustrates the same from the specifications in which job levels are 
incorporated. It can be seen that age-earnings profiles are steeper and that wages of 
older workers do not decrease as much for effective hourly wages compared to 
contractual hourly wages.   
  - insert Figure 4 about here 
  - insert Figure 5 about here 
 
5.  Discussion and concluding remarks 
The main result of this paper is that wage differential estimates are systematically 
biased if the compared groups differ in work absence. The gender gap in effective 
hourly wages is more than one percentage point smaller than the gender gap in 
contractual wages, because women are on average more absent than men. Moreover, 
workers with lower schooling are more absent, which leads to an upward bias in 14 
 
estimates for rates of return to schooling when contractual instead of effective wages are 
used. Older workers are also more absent so that contractual age-earnings profiles are 
significantly flatter than effective age-earnings profiles. Since workers at the lower tail 
of the wage distribution (e.g., women, low schooling) have higher absenteeism rates, the 
concept of effective wages reduces wage inequality compared to contractual wages. Bell 
and Hart (1999) report quite similar findings for unpaid overtime. Worker groups with 
more unpaid overtime have lower effective wages and hence wage differences are 
smaller than for contractual wages (e.g., men, higher schooling). A complete assessment 
of effective wages has therefore to account for paid and unpaid as well as for upward 
and downward adjustments of working hours. The general implication of my results is 
hence that researchers should be aware of potential biases in wage differential estimates 
and hourly wage inequality measures, if they are interested in the effective wage rate, 
which is the core of most economic models, and if absenteeism and other working time 
adjustments are not observed in the data, which is unfortunately the case for most data 
sets. 
As firms are primarily interested in effective wages paid for effective labour supply, 
differences in effective working hours and wages are also likely to affect firms' 
employment decisions. If two groups differ on average in their effective wages, firms 
might statistical discriminate against workers from a group with on average higher 
absenteeism (women, low skilled, older workers) and hence prefer to recruit workers 
from a group with higher effective working hours (men, high skilled, younger workers). 
In a dynamic context, less employment chances for high absent workers might lead to a 
reduction of reservation wages and consequently to contractual wage differentials 
between low and high absent workers. 15 
 
Some general implications on wage inequality and institutional sickness benefit systems 
can also be drawn. Sickness benefits are likely to reduce effective wage inequality 
because low wage workers are on average more absent than high wage workers. 
Therefore, sickness benefits, which are often financed by taxes or insurance premiums, 
lead to redistribution from high wage (low absent) workers to low wage (high absent) 
workers. If taxes and premiums are progressive, as in most countries, this redistribution 
effect is even larger. It might be worthwhile for future research to test relationships 
between the design of sickness benefit and health insurance systems on the one hand 
and inequality measures on the other hand. For this purpose, between and within 
country comparisons as well as natural experiments in micro data sets are possible 
empirical strategies. Such results would also help to improve our understanding of the 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of hours and earnings 
 Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Hours      
Contractual  working  hours  1815.5000 181.1042  207.8400 2088.6000 
Absent working hours  58.3980  77.1738  0  658.0000 
Absence rate  0.0325  0.0428  0  0.3602 
Absence probability  0.7121  0.4528  0  1 
Effective  working  hours  1757.1020 197.3925  207.8400 2088.6000 
      
Earnings      
Yearly gross income in Euros  36727.58  14796.60  3855.14  157478.30 
Log yearly income  10.4447  0.3538  8.2572  11.9670 
Contractual hourly wage in Euros  19.9996  6.7531  9.5514  75.4206 
Log  contractual  wage  2.9474 0.3018 2.2567 4.3231 
Effective hourly wage in Euros  20.6326  6.7553  9.5514  76.8937 
Log  effective  wage  2.9814 0.2928 2.2567 4.3424 
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contractual hourly wage effective hourly wage
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Table 2: Inequality of earnings 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   





wage  (2) - (3) 
Mean 36727.58  19.9996  20.6326  -0.6330 
Standard deviation  14796.60  6.7531  6.7553  -0.0022 
Standard deviation of logs  0.3538  0.3018  0.2928  0.0090 
Relative mean deviation  0.1500  0.1308  0.1259  0.0049 
Coefficient of variation  0.4029  0.3377  0.3274  0.0103 
Gini coefficient  0.2048  0.1766  0.1710  0.0056 
Mehran measure  0.2775  0.2424  0.2351  0.0073 
Piesch measure  0.1685  0.1436  0.1390  0.0047 
Kakwani measure  0.0391  0.0289  0.0272  0.0017 
Theil entropy measure  0.0708  0.0512  0.0482  0.0030 
Theil mean log deviation measure  0.0665  0.0484  0.0455  0.0029 





Table 3: Descriptive statistics of control variables 
 Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Female (dummy)  0.2363  0.4248 
Less than high school degree (dummy, reference)  0.6966  0.4598 
High school degree (dummy)  0.0969  0.2958 
College degree (dummy)  0.2066  0.4049 
Age <25 years (dummy, reference)  0.0225  0.1484 
Age 25-35 years (dummy)  0.1916  0.3936 
Age 35-45 years (dummy)  0.3920  0.4882 
Age 45-55 years (dummy)  0.3081  0.4617 
Age 55-65 years (dummy)  0.0857  0.2800 
Year 1999 (dummy, reference)  0.1285  0.3347 
Year 2000 (dummy)  0.1361  0.3429 
Year 2001 (dummy)  0.1445  0.3516 
Year 2002 (dummy)  0.1566  0.3635 
Year 2003 (dummy)  0.1522  0.3592 
Year 2004 (dummy)  0.1452  0.3524 
Year 2005 (dummy)  0.1368  0.3437 
Blue-collar level 1 (dummy, reference)  0.0339  0.1811 
Blue-collar level 2 (dummy)  0.0270  0.1621 
Blue-collar level 3 (dummy)  0.0396  0.1949 
Blue-collar level 4 (dummy)  0.1638  0.3701 
Blue-collar level 5 (dummy)  0.0799  0.2712 
Blue-collar level 6 (dummy)  0.0470  0.2117 
Blue-collar level 7 (dummy)  0.0195  0.1383 
White-collar level 1 (dummy)  0.0523  0.2227 
White-collar level 2 (dummy)  0.1396  0.3466 
White-collar level 3 (dummy)  0.1478  0.3549 
White-collar level 4 (dummy)  0.0910  0.2877 
White-collar level 5 (dummy)  0.0694  0.2542 
White-collar level 6 (dummy)  0.0890  0.2847 





Table 4: Hours regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
  Contractual 
working hours 
Absent 











Female (dummy)  -136.7559***  13.6377***  0.0099***  0.0910*** -150.2349***  -124.4736***  6.3345*  0.0056***  0.0663*** -134.0164*** 
  (8.1680) (3.1904) (0.0018) (0.0170) (8.5955) (8.3162) (3.5604) (0.0020) (0.0198) (8.8675) 
High school degree (dummy)  -18.5385  -38.9132***  -0.0217*** -0.1056***  20.8897*  -19.2151* -17.8699*** -0.0102***  -0.0524**  1.9734 
  (11.7859)  (4.6502) (0.0026) (0.0248)  (12.4295)  (11.2615) (4.7073)  (0.0026)  (0.0260) (11.9217) 
College degree (dummy)  103.5522***  -40.2240***  -0.0232*** -0.1673***  144.6246***  37.5580***  -13.9547***  -0.0080*** -0.0772*** 52.5169*** 
  (8.3267) (3.2693) (0.0018) (0.0174) (8.7699) (9.4073) (4.0838) (0.0023) (0.0227)  (10.0737) 
Age 25-35 years (dummy)  2.8233  9.5235*  0.0052*  0.0346 -7.2795 -5.3358  11.0182* 0.0064**  0.0385  -17.2298 
  (8.8006) (5.6237) (0.0031) (0.0343)  (10.4785)  (8.8408) (5.7020) (0.0032) (0.0352)  (10.5232) 
Age 35-45 years (dummy)  -7.4289  8.1959  0.0048  -0.0131 -16.1024  -25.9359***  11.7586** 0.0073**  0.0016 -40.0274*** 
  (9.5165) (5.8050) (0.0032) (0.0348)  (11.2200)  (9.5633) (5.9376) (0.0033) (0.0362)  (11.2827) 
Age 45-55 years (dummy)  5.8924  10.4499*  0.0058*  -0.0209 -0.7777  -18.7376*  17.0068*** 0.0100***  0.0065  -34.5452*** 
  (10.1823)  (5.9971) (0.0033) (0.0357)  (11.9055)  (10.1926) (6.1528)  (0.0034)  (0.0373) (11.9368) 
Age 55-65 years (dummy)  16.5921  14.3830**  0.0075**  -0.0576 7.0986  -13.5386  23.4457***  0.0132*** -0.0186  -34.9853*** 
  (11.5945)  (6.6653) (0.0037) (0.0394)  (13.4819)  (11.5292) (6.7940)  (0.0038)  (0.0409) (13.4231) 
Year (6 dummies)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job level (12 dummies)  No  No  No No No Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean dependent variable  1815.50  58.3980  0.0325 0.7121  1757.10  1815.50  58.3980 0.0325  0.7121 1757.10 
R  squared  (overall)  0.2128 0.0580 0.0645 0.0319 0.2282 0.3226 0.1134 0.1190 0.0496 0.3277 
Breusch Pagan test (χ²)  14672.84***  3787.49*** 3757.59*** 2215.78***  12021.37***  12840.16*** 3023.07***  3004.51***  2020.66*** 10211.46*** 
Note: Number of yearly observations is 9633 of 1730 workers. Reference groups are men, have less than high school degree, and are younger than 25 years. Random effects GLS. Standard errors in brackets. 





Table 5: Earnings regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 






(Log wC) - 







(Log wC) - 
(Log wE) 
Female  (dummy)  -0.2411*** -0.1516*** -0.1402*** -0.0105*** -0.1363*** -0.0588*** -0.0425*** -0.0059*** 
  (0.0143) (0.0125) (0.0121) (0.0019) (0.0082) (0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0021) 
High school degree (dummy)  0.1297***  0.1416***  0.1223***  0.0232***  -0.0214*  0.0045  -0.0179**  0.0109*** 
  (0.0204) (0.0178) (0.0173) (0.0028) (0.0111) (0.0079) (0.0083) (0.0028) 
College  degree  (dummy)  0.4644*** 0.4084*** 0.3838*** 0.0247*** 0.0640*** 0.0742*** 0.0326*** 0.0085*** 
  (0.0145) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.0020) (0.0092) (0.0064) (0.0069) (0.0025) 
Age 25-35 years (dummy)  0.0743***  0.0611***  0.0700***  -0.0057*  0.0423***  0.0448***  0.0505***  -0.0069** 
  (0.0089) (0.0049) (0.0066) (0.0034) (0.0081) (0.0043) (0.0059) (0.0034) 
Age 35-45 years (dummy)  0.1061***  0.0923***  0.1077***  -0.0053  0.0602***  0.0722***  0.0831***  -0.0080** 
  (0.0099) (0.0055) (0.0073) (0.0035) (0.0088) (0.0048) (0.0064) (0.0036) 
Age 45-55 years (dummy)  0.1172***  0.0862***  0.1060***  -0.0063*  0.0738***  0.0746***  0.0903***  -0.0109*** 
  (0.0109) (0.0062) (0.0081) (0.0036) (0.0095) (0.0052) (0.0069) (0.0037) 
Age 55-65 years (dummy)  0.1119***  0.0659***  0.0932***  -0.0082**  0.0748***  0.0675***  0.0902***  -0.0144*** 
  (0.0126) (0.0072) (0.0094) (0.0040) (0.0107) (0.0060) (0.0079) (0.0041) 
Year  (6  dummies)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job level (12 dummies)  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Mean  dependent  variable  10.4447  2.9474 2.9814 -0.0340  10.4447  2.9474 2.9814 -0.0340 
R  squared  (overall)  0.4274 0.3944 0.3854 0.0625 0.8375 0.8951 0.8769 0.1158 
Breusch Pagan test (χ²) 19975.58***  22346.56***  20892.66***  3670.24*** 12409.31***  13606.85***  10772.14*** 2939.20*** 
Hausman test (χ²)   45.58***     620.85***   
Note: Number of yearly observations is 9633 of 1730 workers. Reference groups are men, have less than high school degree, and are younger than 25 years. Random effects 
GLS. Hausman test refers to regressions for contractual and effective wages. Standard errors in brackets. Coefficients and  test values are significant at  *** 1%, ** 5 %, and * 
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Figure 5: Age-earnings profiles for contractual and effective wages (with job levels) 
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